24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005

Examination of problems in the intersection of artificial intelligence, psychology, and philosophy. Issues discussed: whether people are Turing Machines, whether computers can be conscious, limitations on what computers can do, computation and neurophysiology, the Turing test, the analog/digital dis...

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Main Author: Byrne, Alexander
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Format: Learning Object
Language:en-US
Published: 2005
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41942
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author Byrne, Alexander
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Byrne, Alexander
author_sort Byrne, Alexander
collection MIT
description Examination of problems in the intersection of artificial intelligence, psychology, and philosophy. Issues discussed: whether people are Turing Machines, whether computers can be conscious, limitations on what computers can do, computation and neurophysiology, the Turing test, the analog/digital distinction, the Chinese Room argument, the causal efficacy of content, the inverted spectrum, mental representation, procedural semantics, connectionism, the relation between simulation and explanation, and whether some aspects of mentality are more resistant to programming than others. From the course home page: Course Description This course is an introduction to many of the central issues in a branch of philosophy called philosophy of mind. Some of the questions we will discuss include the following. Can computers think? Is the mind an immaterial thing? Or is the mind the brain? Or does the mind stand to the brain as a computer program stands to the hardware? How can creatures like ourselves think thoughts that are "about" things? (For example, we can all think that Aristotle is a philosopher, and in that sense think "about" Aristotle, but what is the explanation of this quite remarkable ability?) Can I know whether your experiences and my experiences when we look at raspberries, fire trucks and stop lights are the same? Can consciousness be given a scientific explanation?
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spelling mit-1721.1/419422025-02-24T15:16:47Z 24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005 Mind and Machines Byrne, Alexander Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy artificial intelligence psychology philosophy Turing Machines consciousness computer limitations computation neurophysiology Turing test the analog/digital distinction Chinese Room argument causal efficacy of content inverted spectrum mental representation procedural semantics connectionism Philosophy of mind Examination of problems in the intersection of artificial intelligence, psychology, and philosophy. Issues discussed: whether people are Turing Machines, whether computers can be conscious, limitations on what computers can do, computation and neurophysiology, the Turing test, the analog/digital distinction, the Chinese Room argument, the causal efficacy of content, the inverted spectrum, mental representation, procedural semantics, connectionism, the relation between simulation and explanation, and whether some aspects of mentality are more resistant to programming than others. From the course home page: Course Description This course is an introduction to many of the central issues in a branch of philosophy called philosophy of mind. Some of the questions we will discuss include the following. Can computers think? Is the mind an immaterial thing? Or is the mind the brain? Or does the mind stand to the brain as a computer program stands to the hardware? How can creatures like ourselves think thoughts that are "about" things? (For example, we can all think that Aristotle is a philosopher, and in that sense think "about" Aristotle, but what is the explanation of this quite remarkable ability?) Can I know whether your experiences and my experiences when we look at raspberries, fire trucks and stop lights are the same? Can consciousness be given a scientific explanation? 2005-06 Learning Object 24.119-Spring2005 local: 24.119 local: IMSCP-MD5-b17f453b076edd8e436fce203bdd44a4 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41942 en-US Usage Restrictions: This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2003. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license"). The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. text/html Spring 2005
spellingShingle artificial intelligence
psychology
philosophy
Turing Machines
consciousness
computer limitations
computation
neurophysiology
Turing test
the analog/digital distinction
Chinese Room argument
causal efficacy of content
inverted spectrum
mental representation
procedural semantics
connectionism
Philosophy of mind
Byrne, Alexander
24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005
title 24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005
title_full 24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005
title_fullStr 24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005
title_full_unstemmed 24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005
title_short 24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2005
title_sort 24 119 mind and machines spring 2005
topic artificial intelligence
psychology
philosophy
Turing Machines
consciousness
computer limitations
computation
neurophysiology
Turing test
the analog/digital distinction
Chinese Room argument
causal efficacy of content
inverted spectrum
mental representation
procedural semantics
connectionism
Philosophy of mind
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41942
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