New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies)
Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without any problem of (1) equilibrium selection and (2) player collusion. To advance resilient mechanism design,We put forward a new meaningful benchmark for the COMBINED social welfare-revenue performance...
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2008
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/42893 |
| _version_ | 1826205930000220160 |
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| author | Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio |
| author2 | Silvio Micali |
| author_facet | Silvio Micali Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio |
| author_sort | Chen, Jing |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without any problem of (1) equilibrium selection and (2) player collusion. To advance resilient mechanism design,We put forward a new meaningful benchmark for the COMBINED social welfare-revenue performance of any mechanism in truly combinatorial auctions.We put forward a NEW notion of implementation, much more general than the ones used so far, which we believe to be of independent interest.We put forward a new RESILIENT mechanism that, by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each other, guarantees at least one half of our benchmark under a very general collusion model. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:21:18Z |
| id | mit-1721.1/42893 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:21:18Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/428932019-04-12T09:57:56Z New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio Silvio Micali Theory of Computation knowledge benchmarks implementation in surviving strategies equilibrium-less implementation combinatorial auctions resilient mechanisms collusion truly combinatorial auctions Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without any problem of (1) equilibrium selection and (2) player collusion. To advance resilient mechanism design,We put forward a new meaningful benchmark for the COMBINED social welfare-revenue performance of any mechanism in truly combinatorial auctions.We put forward a NEW notion of implementation, much more general than the ones used so far, which we believe to be of independent interest.We put forward a new RESILIENT mechanism that, by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each other, guarantees at least one half of our benchmark under a very general collusion model. 2008-10-08T20:15:07Z 2008-10-08T20:15:07Z 2008-10-08 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/42893 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-041 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-059 32 p. application/pdf application/postscript |
| spellingShingle | knowledge benchmarks implementation in surviving strategies equilibrium-less implementation combinatorial auctions resilient mechanisms collusion truly combinatorial auctions Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title | New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_full | New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_fullStr | New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_full_unstemmed | New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_short | New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_sort | new resiliency in truly combinatorial auctions and implementation in surviving strategies |
| topic | knowledge benchmarks implementation in surviving strategies equilibrium-less implementation combinatorial auctions resilient mechanisms collusion truly combinatorial auctions |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/42893 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chenjing newresiliencyintrulycombinatorialauctionsandimplementationinsurvivingstrategies AT micalisilvio newresiliencyintrulycombinatorialauctionsandimplementationinsurvivingstrategies |