Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies)
We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance (1) in a very adversarial collusion model; (2) for any profile of strategies surviving the iterated el...
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2008
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43715 |
| _version_ | 1826209277390356480 |
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| author | Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing |
| author2 | Silvio Micali |
| author_facet | Silvio Micali Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing |
| author_sort | Micali, Silvio |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance (1) in a very adversarial collusion model; (2) for any profile of strategies surviving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies; and (3) by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each other (in a non-Bayesian setting).Our mechanism also is computationally efficient, and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:19:57Z |
| id | mit-1721.1/43715 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:19:57Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/437152019-04-12T09:57:47Z Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies) Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing Silvio Micali Theory of Computation Silvio Micali Theory of Computation Implementation in surviving strategies Resilient Mechanism Design Privacy-preserving mechanisms Equilibrium-less mechanism design Knowledge benchmarks We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance (1) in a very adversarial collusion model; (2) for any profile of strategies surviving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies; and (3) by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each other (in a non-Bayesian setting).Our mechanism also is computationally efficient, and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent. 2008-12-03T16:15:09Z 2008-12-03T16:15:09Z 2008-10-08 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43715 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-059 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-071 18 p. application/pdf application/postscript |
| spellingShingle | Implementation in surviving strategies Resilient Mechanism Design Privacy-preserving mechanisms Equilibrium-less mechanism design Knowledge benchmarks Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title | Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_full | Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_fullStr | Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_short | Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies) |
| title_sort | resilient knowledge based mechanisms for truly combinatorial auctions and implementation in surviving strategies |
| topic | Implementation in surviving strategies Resilient Mechanism Design Privacy-preserving mechanisms Equilibrium-less mechanism design Knowledge benchmarks |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43715 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT micalisilvio resilientknowledgebasedmechanismsfortrulycombinatorialauctionsandimplementationinsurvivingstrategies AT chenjing resilientknowledgebasedmechanismsfortrulycombinatorialauctionsandimplementationinsurvivingstrategies |