End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems
Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2008.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44729 |
| _version_ | 1811090216316829696 |
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| author | Shen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi) |
| author2 | Ronald L. Rivest. |
| author_facet | Ronald L. Rivest. Shen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi) |
| author_sort | Shen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi) |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2008. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:37:25Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/44729 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:37:25Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/447292019-04-10T08:43:45Z End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems Shen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi) Ronald L. Rivest. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-59). End-to-end verifiable voting systems allow voters to verify that their votes are cast as intended, collected as cast, and counted as collected. Essentially, end-to-end voting systems provide voters assurance that each step of the election worked correctly. At the same time, voting systems must protect voter privacy and prevent the possibility of improper voter influence and voter coercion. Several end-to-end voting systems have been proposed, varying in usability and practicality. In this thesis we describe and analyze Scantegrity II, a novel end-to-end verification mechanism for optical scan voting which uses confirmation codes printed on the ballot in invisible ink. The confirmation codes allow voters to create privacy-preserving receipts which voters can check against the bulletin board after the close of the election to ensure that their votes have been collected as cast. Anyone can check that votes have been counted as collected and that the tally is correct. We describe the Scantegrity II system and analyze the integrity and privacy properties it provides. by Emily Shen. S.M. 2009-03-16T19:35:23Z 2009-03-16T19:35:23Z 2008 2008 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44729 298133132 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 59 p. application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Shen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi) End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems |
| title | End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems |
| title_full | End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems |
| title_fullStr | End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems |
| title_full_unstemmed | End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems |
| title_short | End-to-end verifiability for optical scan voting systems |
| title_sort | end to end verifiability for optical scan voting systems |
| topic | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44729 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT shenemilyemilyhueiyi endtoendverifiabilityforopticalscanvotingsystems |