Multipollutant markets
I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g. air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should have pollution markets integrated through optimal...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
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MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44980 |
| _version_ | 1826195458301624320 |
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| author | Montero, Juan-Pablo |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. Montero, Juan-Pablo |
| author_sort | Montero, Juan-Pablo |
| collection | MIT |
| description | I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g. air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should have pollution markets integrated through optimal exchange rates when the marginal abatement cost curves in the different markets are steeper than the marginal benefit curves; otherwise he should keep markets separated. I also find that incomplete enforcement reduces the advantage of market integration. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:13:00Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/44980 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:13:00Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/449802019-04-10T11:14:30Z Multipollutant markets Montero, Juan-Pablo Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g. air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should have pollution markets integrated through optimal exchange rates when the marginal abatement cost curves in the different markets are steeper than the marginal benefit curves; otherwise he should keep markets separated. I also find that incomplete enforcement reduces the advantage of market integration. Supported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. 2009-04-03T17:04:52Z 2009-04-03T17:04:52Z 2001 Working Paper 2001-008 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44980 52314541 MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 01-008WP. 24 p application/pdf MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research |
| spellingShingle | Montero, Juan-Pablo Multipollutant markets |
| title | Multipollutant markets |
| title_full | Multipollutant markets |
| title_fullStr | Multipollutant markets |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multipollutant markets |
| title_short | Multipollutant markets |
| title_sort | multipollutant markets |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44980 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT monterojuanpablo multipollutantmarkets |