Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action

Alternative market structures are distinguishable by the degree of parallel action exhibited by producers. We show that the correlation between output levels varies systematically with the degree of interdependence among firms, and establish an ordering among alternative behavioral hypotheses (Courn...

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Main Author: Smith, James L.
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
Format: Working Paper
Published: MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research 2009
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44999
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author Smith, James L.
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
Smith, James L.
author_sort Smith, James L.
collection MIT
description Alternative market structures are distinguishable by the degree of parallel action exhibited by producers. We show that the correlation between output levels varies systematically with the degree of interdependence among firms, and establish an ordering among alternative behavioral hypotheses (Cournot, Stackelberg, Edgeworth/Bertrand, collusion, and perfect competition). Because the ordering is invariant to the values of background parameters, statistical tests of market conduct may be possible even when the slopes of the demand curve and marginal cost curves are unknown. An application to the world oil market finds strong evidence of collusive behavior among OPEC members, but not elsewhere.
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spelling mit-1721.1/449992019-04-10T20:51:55Z Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action Smith, James L. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. Alternative market structures are distinguishable by the degree of parallel action exhibited by producers. We show that the correlation between output levels varies systematically with the degree of interdependence among firms, and establish an ordering among alternative behavioral hypotheses (Cournot, Stackelberg, Edgeworth/Bertrand, collusion, and perfect competition). Because the ordering is invariant to the values of background parameters, statistical tests of market conduct may be possible even when the slopes of the demand curve and marginal cost curves are unknown. An application to the world oil market finds strong evidence of collusive behavior among OPEC members, but not elsewhere. 2009-04-03T17:05:30Z 2009-04-03T17:05:30Z 2003 Working Paper 2003-006 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44999 53192909 MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 03-006WP. 30 p application/pdf MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
spellingShingle Smith, James L.
Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action
title Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action
title_full Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action
title_fullStr Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action
title_full_unstemmed Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action
title_short Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action
title_sort distinguishable patterns of competition collusion and parallel action
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44999
work_keys_str_mv AT smithjamesl distinguishablepatternsofcompetitioncollusionandparallelaction