Distinguishable patterns of competition, collusion, and parallel action
Alternative market structures are distinguishable by the degree of parallel action exhibited by producers. We show that the correlation between output levels varies systematically with the degree of interdependence among firms, and establish an ordering among alternative behavioral hypotheses (Courn...
Main Author: | Smith, James L. |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
2009
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44999 |
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