Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool
Electricity generators can raise the price of power by withholding their plant from the market. We discuss two ways in which this could have affected prices in the England and Wales Pool. Withholding low-cost capacity which should be generating will raise energy prices but make the pattern of genera...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
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MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45019 |
| _version_ | 1811094451520536576 |
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| author | Green, Richard |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. Green, Richard |
| author_sort | Green, Richard |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Electricity generators can raise the price of power by withholding their plant from the market. We discuss two ways in which this could have affected prices in the England and Wales Pool. Withholding low-cost capacity which should be generating will raise energy prices but make the pattern of generation less efficient. This pattern improved significantly after privatisation. Withholding capacity that was not expected to generate would raise the Capacity Payments based on spare capacity. On a multi-year basis, these did not usually exceed ₃competitive₄ levels, the cost of keeping stations open. The evidence for large-scale capacity withholding is weak. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:00:17Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/45019 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:00:17Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/450192019-04-12T09:55:45Z Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool Green, Richard Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. Electricity generators can raise the price of power by withholding their plant from the market. We discuss two ways in which this could have affected prices in the England and Wales Pool. Withholding low-cost capacity which should be generating will raise energy prices but make the pattern of generation less efficient. This pattern improved significantly after privatisation. Withholding capacity that was not expected to generate would raise the Capacity Payments based on spare capacity. On a multi-year basis, these did not usually exceed ₃competitive₄ levels, the cost of keeping stations open. The evidence for large-scale capacity withholding is weak. Supported by the Leverhulme Trust through the award of a Philip Leverhulme prize, and a grant from the Social Research Council 2009-04-03T17:06:08Z 2009-04-03T17:06:08Z 2004 Working Paper 2004-010 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45019 58723519 MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 04-010WP. 21 p application/pdf MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research |
| spellingShingle | Green, Richard Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool |
| title | Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool |
| title_full | Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool |
| title_fullStr | Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool |
| title_full_unstemmed | Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool |
| title_short | Did English generators play cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool |
| title_sort | did english generators play cournot capacity withholding in the electricity pool |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45019 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT greenrichard didenglishgeneratorsplaycournotcapacitywithholdingintheelectricitypool |