Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly
We consider an infinitely-repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibili...
Main Authors: | Liski, Matti, Montero, Juan-Pablo |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
2009
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45036 |
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