Market power in a storable-good market : theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading
We consider a market for storable pollution permits in which a large agent and a fringe of small agents gradually consume a stock of permits until they reach a long-run emissions limit. The subgame-perfect equilibrium exhibits no market power unless the large agent's share of the initial stock...
Main Authors: | Liski, Matti, Montero, Juan-Pablo |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
2009
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45046 |
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