Optimal design of a phase-in emissions trading program with voluntary compliance options
In this paper we explore the welfare implications of voluntary compliance within an emissions trading program and derive optimal permits allocations to affected and opti-in sources when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual unrestricted emissions and control costs. The...
Main Author: | Montero, Juan Pablo |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
2009
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45073 |
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