Corporate governance and insider trading
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2008.
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Format: | Thesis |
Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2009
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45333 |
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author | Rozanov, Konstantin A |
author2 | S.P. Kothari. |
author_facet | S.P. Kothari. Rozanov, Konstantin A |
author_sort | Rozanov, Konstantin A |
collection | MIT |
description | Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2008. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:12:17Z |
format | Thesis |
id | mit-1721.1/45333 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | eng |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:12:17Z |
publishDate | 2009 |
publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/453332022-01-13T07:54:52Z Corporate governance and insider trading Rozanov, Konstantin A S.P. Kothari. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management Sloan School of Management. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-64). I investigate the relation between corporate governance and insider trading by corporate executives. Despite the general view that trade on non-public information adversely affects capital market participants, the impact of corporate governance on such trading remains relatively unexplored in prior research. I propose an empirical measure that relies on a predicted pattern in stock returns to identify transactions that are more likely to be based on private information and provide evidence to validate the construct. Using this measure, I find that good corporate governance, identified through board and ownership characteristics that have been linked to more effective monitoring of management in prior research, is negatively related to opportunistic insider trading. In supplementary analysis, I provide evidence on the robustness of this relation to an alternative hypothesis and to potential endogeneity. Overall, I conclude that good corporate governance helps to attenuate opportunistic insider trading. by Konstantin A. Rozanov. Ph.D. 2009-04-29T17:27:00Z 2009-04-29T17:27:00Z 2008 2008 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45333 315871878 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 77 p. application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
spellingShingle | Sloan School of Management. Rozanov, Konstantin A Corporate governance and insider trading |
title | Corporate governance and insider trading |
title_full | Corporate governance and insider trading |
title_fullStr | Corporate governance and insider trading |
title_full_unstemmed | Corporate governance and insider trading |
title_short | Corporate governance and insider trading |
title_sort | corporate governance and insider trading |
topic | Sloan School of Management. |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45333 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT rozanovkonstantina corporategovernanceandinsidertrading |