The diversity of design of TSOs
It is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a Wilson (2002) modular framework. Applied to the management of elec...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Published: |
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
2009
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45519 |
| _version_ | 1811076052375568384 |
|---|---|
| author | Rious, Vincent |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. Rious, Vincent |
| author_sort | Rious, Vincent |
| collection | MIT |
| description | It is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a Wilson (2002) modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externalities; 2° the long run management of network investment; and 3° the coordination of neighboring Transmission System Operators for cross border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified twenty seven options of organisation, we define an Ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that 1°monopoly design differs from this Ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the "institutional" definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of transmission systems operators are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organisation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:15:21Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/45519 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:15:21Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/455192019-04-11T00:32:18Z The diversity of design of TSOs Rious, Vincent Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. It is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a Wilson (2002) modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externalities; 2° the long run management of network investment; and 3° the coordination of neighboring Transmission System Operators for cross border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified twenty seven options of organisation, we define an Ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that 1°monopoly design differs from this Ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the "institutional" definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of transmission systems operators are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organisation. 2009-05-13T20:35:22Z 2009-05-13T20:35:22Z 2008 Working Paper 2008-005 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45519 244443854 MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 08-005WP. 26 p application/pdf MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research |
| spellingShingle | Rious, Vincent The diversity of design of TSOs |
| title | The diversity of design of TSOs |
| title_full | The diversity of design of TSOs |
| title_fullStr | The diversity of design of TSOs |
| title_full_unstemmed | The diversity of design of TSOs |
| title_short | The diversity of design of TSOs |
| title_sort | diversity of design of tsos |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45519 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT riousvincent thediversityofdesignoftsos AT riousvincent diversityofdesignoftsos |