Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players
We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps...
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2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49869 |
| _version_ | 1826204923835973632 |
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| author | Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing |
| author2 | Silvio Micali |
| author_facet | Silvio Micali Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing |
| author_sort | Micali, Silvio |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps and communication bits, and (3) preserves the privacy of the players' types to a very high extent. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:03:11Z |
| id | mit-1721.1/49869 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:03:11Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/498692019-04-10T11:27:19Z Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing Silvio Micali Theory of Computation rationally robust implementation Virtual implementation perfectly informed players We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps and communication bits, and (3) preserves the privacy of the players' types to a very high extent. 2009-12-09T21:15:08Z 2009-12-09T21:15:08Z 2009-12-04 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49869 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061 4 p. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | rationally robust implementation Virtual implementation perfectly informed players Micali, Silvio Chen, Jing Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players |
| title | Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players |
| title_full | Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players |
| title_fullStr | Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players |
| title_full_unstemmed | Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players |
| title_short | Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players |
| title_sort | perfect and general virtual implementation for perfectly informed players |
| topic | rationally robust implementation Virtual implementation perfectly informed players |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49869 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT micalisilvio perfectandgeneralvirtualimplementationforperfectlyinformedplayers AT chenjing perfectandgeneralvirtualimplementationforperfectlyinformedplayers |