Experience and Content
The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Blackwell Publishing
2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50132 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 |
| _version_ | 1826190805104066560 |
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| author | Byrne, Alex |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Byrne, Alex |
| author_sort | Byrne, Alex |
| collection | MIT |
| description | The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are partially vindicated, because perceptual error is due to false belief. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:45:57Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/50132 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:45:57Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/501322022-09-23T14:23:06Z Experience and Content Byrne, Alex Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Byrne, Alex Byrne, Alex The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are partially vindicated, because perceptual error is due to false belief. 2009-12-11T20:13:54Z 2009-12-11T20:13:54Z 2009-04 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/SubmittedJournalArticle 0031-8094 1467-9213 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50132 Byrne, Alex. “Experience and Content.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59.236 (2009): 429-451. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.614.x Philosophical Quarterly Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Blackwell Publishing Alex Byrne |
| spellingShingle | Byrne, Alex Experience and Content |
| title | Experience and Content |
| title_full | Experience and Content |
| title_fullStr | Experience and Content |
| title_full_unstemmed | Experience and Content |
| title_short | Experience and Content |
| title_sort | experience and content |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50132 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT byrnealex experienceandcontent |