Perfect Implementation
Privacy and trust a effect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism |by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator| may fail to re...
Main Authors: | Izmalkov, Sergei, Lepinski, Matt, Micali, Silvio |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Elsevier
2010
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50634 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 |
Similar Items
-
Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms
by: Izmalkov, Sergei, et al.
Published: (2007) -
Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms
by: Izmalkov, Sergei, et al.
Published: (2008) -
Verifiably Secure Devices
by: Lepinski, Matt, et al.
Published: (2007) -
The Security Power of the Ballot Box
by: Lepinski, Matt, et al.
Published: (2005) -
Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players
by: Micali, Silvio, et al.
Published: (2009)