STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY

Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSO's). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents agains...

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Main Author: Schmalensee, Richard
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Blackwell Publishing 2010
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/52729
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6351-2300
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author Schmalensee, Richard
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Schmalensee, Richard
author_sort Schmalensee, Richard
collection MIT
description Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSO's). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSO's should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.
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spelling mit-1721.1/527292022-09-27T14:32:27Z STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY Schmalensee, Richard Sloan School of Management Schmalensee, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSO's). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSO's should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed. 2010-03-18T19:53:58Z 2010-03-18T19:53:58Z 2009-08 2008 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/SubmittedJournalArticle 0022-1821 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/52729 Schmalensee, Richard. "STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY." The Journal of Industrial Economics 57.3 (2009): 526-552. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6351-2300 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00388.x Journal of Industrial Economics Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Blackwell Publishing Richard Schmalensee
spellingShingle Schmalensee, Richard
STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
title STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
title_full STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
title_fullStr STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
title_full_unstemmed STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
title_short STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
title_sort standard setting innovation specialists and competition policy
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/52729
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6351-2300
work_keys_str_mv AT schmalenseerichard standardsettinginnovationspecialistsandcompetitionpolicy