Location Games and Bounds for Median Problems
We consider a two-person zero-sum game in which the maximizer selects a point in a given bounded planar region, the minimizer selects K points in that region,.and the payoff is the distance from the maximizer's location to the minimizer's location closest to it. In a variant of this game,...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Operations Research Center
2004
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5368 |
| Summary: | We consider a two-person zero-sum game in which the maximizer selects a point in a given bounded planar region, the minimizer selects K points in that region,.and the payoff is the distance from the maximizer's location to the minimizer's location closest to it. In a variant of this game, the maximizer has the privilege of restricting the game to any subset of the given region. We evaluate/approximate the values (and the saddle point strategies) of these games for K = 1 as well as for K + , thus obtaining tight upper bounds (and worst possible demand distributions) for K-median problems. |
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