Practical knowledge and abilities
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.
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Format: | Thesis |
Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2010
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55177 |
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author | Glick, Ephraim N |
author2 | Robert Stalnaker. |
author_facet | Robert Stalnaker. Glick, Ephraim N |
author_sort | Glick, Ephraim N |
collection | MIT |
description | Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:55:13Z |
format | Thesis |
id | mit-1721.1/55177 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | eng |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:55:13Z |
publishDate | 2010 |
publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/551772019-04-10T08:41:48Z Practical knowledge and abilities Glick, Ephraim N Robert Stalnaker. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. Linguistics and Philosophy. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-118). The thesis is an exploration of the relations between know-how, abilities, and ordinary knowledge of facts. It is shown that there is a distinctively practical sort of know-how and a corresponding interpretation of 'S knows how to [phi]', and that this special sort of know-how, while possessing representational content, is not simply ordinary knowledge-that. The view rests on a novel distinction between two interpretations of the Intellectualist slogan, familiar from the work of Gilbert Ryle, that know-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction allows us to clarify the issues that are at stake in the debate and see the possibility of a position that combines aspects of both Intellectualism and anti-Intellectualism. An entailment from knowhow to a certain sort of ability is defended, and it is shown that the present view preserves the possibility of appealing to know-how to block Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" against physicalism. by Ephraim N. Glick. Ph.D. 2010-05-25T20:58:11Z 2010-05-25T20:58:11Z 2009 2009 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55177 608215768 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 118 p. application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
spellingShingle | Linguistics and Philosophy. Glick, Ephraim N Practical knowledge and abilities |
title | Practical knowledge and abilities |
title_full | Practical knowledge and abilities |
title_fullStr | Practical knowledge and abilities |
title_full_unstemmed | Practical knowledge and abilities |
title_short | Practical knowledge and abilities |
title_sort | practical knowledge and abilities |
topic | Linguistics and Philosophy. |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55177 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT glickephraimn practicalknowledgeandabilities |