Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict
The range and quantity of government activity has grown exponentially over the course of this century. In response, an "institutional Presidency" has developed. Today’s President is at the locus of a network of relationships designed to increase his capacity to influence the flow of events...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | en_US |
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Center for Public Leadership
2010
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55802 |
| _version_ | 1826210866351046656 |
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| author | Lazer, David |
| author_facet | Lazer, David |
| author_sort | Lazer, David |
| collection | MIT |
| description | The range and quantity of government activity has grown exponentially over the course of this century. In response, an "institutional Presidency" has developed. Today’s President is at the locus of a network of relationships designed to increase his capacity to influence the flow of events.
This paper examines a small sample of those relationships: His relationship with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a division of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that reviews regulations. OIRA was one of the key instruments used by the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations to limit regulation. The operational question of this paper is: What happened to the OIRA-White House relationship when there was a change in party and policy preferences in the White House in 1993? That is, how does a relatively pro-regulatory White House use OIRA?
To answer this question, this paper examines panel data on the policy preferences and social interaction patterns of OIRA members, time series data on the disposition of reviewed regulations, and structured interviews with members of OIRA. Analysis of these data indicates that the review process institutionalizes conflict between the OMB and agencies, resulting in appeals to the President when actors believe that the President will support their views. Thus, the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations economized on their limited ability to monitor the Executive Branch by focusing their attention and political support on members of OIRA with compatible viewpoints. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:56:59Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/55802 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:56:59Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Center for Public Leadership |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/558022019-04-12T23:40:15Z Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict Lazer, David policy executive branch Bush Reagan OMB OIRA influence president government The range and quantity of government activity has grown exponentially over the course of this century. In response, an "institutional Presidency" has developed. Today’s President is at the locus of a network of relationships designed to increase his capacity to influence the flow of events. This paper examines a small sample of those relationships: His relationship with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a division of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that reviews regulations. OIRA was one of the key instruments used by the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations to limit regulation. The operational question of this paper is: What happened to the OIRA-White House relationship when there was a change in party and policy preferences in the White House in 1993? That is, how does a relatively pro-regulatory White House use OIRA? To answer this question, this paper examines panel data on the policy preferences and social interaction patterns of OIRA members, time series data on the disposition of reviewed regulations, and structured interviews with members of OIRA. Analysis of these data indicates that the review process institutionalizes conflict between the OMB and agencies, resulting in appeals to the President when actors believe that the President will support their views. Thus, the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations economized on their limited ability to monitor the Executive Branch by focusing their attention and political support on members of OIRA with compatible viewpoints. 2010-06-09T03:09:15Z 2010-06-09T03:09:15Z 2003 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55802 en_US Center for Public Leadership Working Paper Series;03-04 application/pdf Center for Public Leadership |
| spellingShingle | policy executive branch Bush Reagan OMB OIRA influence president government Lazer, David Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict |
| title | Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict |
| title_full | Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict |
| title_fullStr | Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict |
| title_full_unstemmed | Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict |
| title_short | Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and Institutional Conflict |
| title_sort | regulatory review presidential control through selective communication and institutional conflict |
| topic | policy executive branch Bush Reagan OMB OIRA influence president government |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55802 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lazerdavid regulatoryreviewpresidentialcontrolthroughselectivecommunicationandinstitutionalconflict |