| Summary: | The acute threat of internationally driven and homeland-directed terrorism has changed the rules and expectations for governmental action, interaction, and willpower. Unprecedented coordination of resources, information, and expertise is required in the face of new hazards emanating from an elusive and a yet active and well-organized network of hostile terrorist cells (Danzig, 2003). While the period since 9/11 has witnessed a spate of governmental reorganization and restructuring—the most visible in
the speedy formation of the Department of Homeland Security and the 9/11 Commission recommended revamping of intelligence agencies1 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004)—the hoped for change in behavior and impact has lagged far behind shifts in organizational form and mandate2 (Mintz, 2005). This reluctance to change is alarming given the enormity of the immediate terrorist danger and the consequences of less-than-optimal prevention, emergency preparedness, and response. How can this
resistance to change be understood, and what can be done strategically to accelerate realization of full national preparedness potential?
|
|---|