Persistence of civil wars
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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MIT Press
2010
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58990 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 |
| _version_ | 1811093852000354304 |
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| author | Acemoglu, Daron Ticchi, Davide Vindigni, Andrea |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, Daron Ticchi, Davide Vindigni, Andrea |
| author_sort | Acemoglu, Daron |
| collection | MIT |
| description | A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive in?uence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely una¤ected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for ?ghting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:51:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/58990 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:51:27Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/589902022-09-29T16:37:09Z Persistence of civil wars Acemoglu, Daron Ticchi, Davide Vindigni, Andrea Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, Daron Acemoglu, Daron civil wars commitment coups military political transitions political economy A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive in?uence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely una¤ected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for ?ghting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future. National Science Fundation (U.S.) 2010-10-08T18:27:39Z 2010-10-08T18:27:39Z 2010-04 2009-09 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1542-4766 1542-4774 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58990 Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni. "Persistence of civil wars." Journal of the European Economic Association 2010 8:2-3, 664-676. © 2010 by the European Economic Association https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2010.8.2-3.664 Journal of the European Economic Association Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf MIT Press MIT Press |
| spellingShingle | civil wars commitment coups military political transitions political economy Acemoglu, Daron Ticchi, Davide Vindigni, Andrea Persistence of civil wars |
| title | Persistence of civil wars |
| title_full | Persistence of civil wars |
| title_fullStr | Persistence of civil wars |
| title_full_unstemmed | Persistence of civil wars |
| title_short | Persistence of civil wars |
| title_sort | persistence of civil wars |
| topic | civil wars commitment coups military political transitions political economy |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58990 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT acemogludaron persistenceofcivilwars AT ticchidavide persistenceofcivilwars AT vindigniandrea persistenceofcivilwars |