MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics
Many recent studies show that firms profit from connections to influential politicians, but less is known about how much politicians financially benefit from wielding political influence. We estimate the returns to serving in Parliament, using original data on the estates of recently deceased Britis...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Cambridge University Press
2010
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/59819 |
| _version_ | 1811092386182332416 |
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| author | Hainmueller, Jens Eggers, Andrew C. |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science Hainmueller, Jens Eggers, Andrew C. |
| author_sort | Hainmueller, Jens |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Many recent studies show that firms profit from connections to influential politicians, but less is known about how much politicians financially benefit from wielding political influence. We estimate the returns to serving in Parliament, using original data on the estates of recently deceased British politicians. Applying both matching and a regression discontinuity design to compare Members of Parliament (MPs) with parliamentary candidates who narrowly lost, we find that serving in office almost doubled the wealth of Conservative MPs, but had no discernible financial benefits for Labour MPs. Conservative MPs profited from office largely through lucrative outside employment they acquired as a result of their political positions; we show that gaining a seat in Parliament more than tripled the probability that a Conservative politician would later serve as a director of a publicly traded firm—enough to account for a sizable portion of the wealth differential. We suggest that Labour MPs did not profit from office largely because trade unions collectively exerted sufficient control over the party and its MPs to prevent members from selling their services to other clients. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:17:20Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/59819 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:17:20Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/598192022-09-29T13:55:19Z MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics Hainmueller, Jens Eggers, Andrew C. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science Hainmueller, Jens Hainmueller, Jens Many recent studies show that firms profit from connections to influential politicians, but less is known about how much politicians financially benefit from wielding political influence. We estimate the returns to serving in Parliament, using original data on the estates of recently deceased British politicians. Applying both matching and a regression discontinuity design to compare Members of Parliament (MPs) with parliamentary candidates who narrowly lost, we find that serving in office almost doubled the wealth of Conservative MPs, but had no discernible financial benefits for Labour MPs. Conservative MPs profited from office largely through lucrative outside employment they acquired as a result of their political positions; we show that gaining a seat in Parliament more than tripled the probability that a Conservative politician would later serve as a director of a publicly traded firm—enough to account for a sizable portion of the wealth differential. We suggest that Labour MPs did not profit from office largely because trade unions collectively exerted sufficient control over the party and its MPs to prevent members from selling their services to other clients. Harvard University. Institute for Quantitative Social Science 2010-11-04T20:02:50Z 2010-11-04T20:02:50Z 2009-10 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0003-0554 1537-5943 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/59819 Eggers, Andrew C., and Jens Hainmueller. “MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics.” American Political Science Review 103.04 (2009): 513-533. en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055409990190 American Political Science Review Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Cambridge University Press MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Hainmueller, Jens Eggers, Andrew C. MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics |
| title | MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics |
| title_full | MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics |
| title_fullStr | MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics |
| title_full_unstemmed | MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics |
| title_short | MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics |
| title_sort | mps for sale returns to office in postwar british politics |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/59819 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hainmuellerjens mpsforsalereturnstoofficeinpostwarbritishpolitics AT eggersandrewc mpsforsalereturnstoofficeinpostwarbritishpolitics |