Game-theoretic learning algorithm for a spatial coverage problem
In this paper we consider a class of dynamic vehicle routing problems, in which a number of mobile agents in the plane must visit target points generated over time by a stochastic process. It is desired to design motion coordination strategies in order to minimize the expected time between the appea...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
2010
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/60305 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0505-1400 |
| Summary: | In this paper we consider a class of dynamic vehicle routing problems, in which a number of mobile agents in the plane must visit target points generated over time by a stochastic process. It is desired to design motion coordination strategies in order to minimize the expected time between the appearance of a target point and the time it is visited by one of the agents. We cast the problem as a spatial game in which each agent's objective is to maximize the expected value of the à ¿time spent aloneà ¿ at the next target location and show that the Nash equilibria of the game correspond to the desired agent configurations. We propose learning-based control strategies that, while making minimal or no assumptions on communications between agents as well as the underlying distribution, provide the same level of steady-state performance achieved by the best known decentralized strategies. |
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