Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types

We investigate mechanism design when the players do not exactly know their types, but have instead only partial information about them.

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chiesa, Alessandro, Micali, Silvio, Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
Other Authors: Silvio Micali
Published: 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61008
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author Chiesa, Alessandro
Micali, Silvio
Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
author2 Silvio Micali
author_facet Silvio Micali
Chiesa, Alessandro
Micali, Silvio
Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
author_sort Chiesa, Alessandro
collection MIT
description We investigate mechanism design when the players do not exactly know their types, but have instead only partial information about them.
first_indexed 2024-09-23T12:02:09Z
id mit-1721.1/61008
institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
last_indexed 2024-09-23T12:02:09Z
publishDate 2011
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spelling mit-1721.1/610082019-04-12T12:45:32Z Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types Chiesa, Alessandro Micali, Silvio Zhu, Zeyuan Allen Silvio Micali Theory of Computation Type uncertainty Mechanism Design Auctions Social Welfare We investigate mechanism design when the players do not exactly know their types, but have instead only partial information about them. 2011-02-22T21:30:08Z 2011-02-22T21:30:08Z 2011-02-16 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61008 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2011-009 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2011-024 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62296 18 p. application/pdf
spellingShingle Type uncertainty
Mechanism Design
Auctions
Social Welfare
Chiesa, Alessandro
Micali, Silvio
Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
title Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
title_full Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
title_fullStr Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
title_full_unstemmed Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
title_short Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
title_sort mechanism design with approximate player types
topic Type uncertainty
Mechanism Design
Auctions
Social Welfare
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61008
work_keys_str_mv AT chiesaalessandro mechanismdesignwithapproximateplayertypes
AT micalisilvio mechanismdesignwithapproximateplayertypes
AT zhuzeyuanallen mechanismdesignwithapproximateplayertypes