Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
We investigate mechanism design when the players do not exactly know their types, but have instead only partial information about them.
Main Authors: | Chiesa, Alessandro, Micali, Silvio, Zhu, Zeyuan Allen |
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Other Authors: | Silvio Micali |
Published: |
2011
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61008 |
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