Proof-carrying data

Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2010.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Chiesa, Alessandro
Other Authors: Ronald L. Rivest and Eran Tromer.
Format: Thesis
Language:eng
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61151
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author Chiesa, Alessandro
author2 Ronald L. Rivest and Eran Tromer.
author_facet Ronald L. Rivest and Eran Tromer.
Chiesa, Alessandro
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description Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2010.
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spelling mit-1721.1/611512019-04-12T07:23:27Z Proof-carrying data PCD Chiesa, Alessandro Ronald L. Rivest and Eran Tromer. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2010. Page 96 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-95). The security of systems can often be expressed as ensuring that some property is maintained at every step of a distributed computation conducted by untrusted parties. Special cases include integrity of programs running on untrusted platforms, various forms of confidentiality and side-channel resilience, and domain-specific invariants. We propose a new approach, proof-carrying data (PCD), which sidesteps the threat of faults and leakage by reasoning about properties of a computation's output data, regardless of the process that produced it. In PCD, the system designer prescribes the desired properties of a computation's outputs. Corresponding proofs are attached to every message flowing through the system, and are mutually verified by the system's components. Each such proof attests that the message's data and all of its history comply with the prescribed properties. We construct a general protocol compiler that generates, propagates, and verifies such proofs of compliance, while preserving the dynamics and efficiency of the original computation. Our main technical tool is the cryptographic construction of short non-interactive arguments (computationally-sound proofs) for statements whose truth depends on "hearsay evidence": previous arguments about other statements. To this end, we attain a particularly strong proof-of-knowledge property. We realize the above, under standard cryptographic assumptions, in a model where the prover has blackbox access to some simple functionality - essentially, a signature card. by Alessandro Chiesa. M.Eng. 2011-02-23T14:20:59Z 2011-02-23T14:20:59Z 2010 2010 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61151 698133641 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 96 p. application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Chiesa, Alessandro
Proof-carrying data
title Proof-carrying data
title_full Proof-carrying data
title_fullStr Proof-carrying data
title_full_unstemmed Proof-carrying data
title_short Proof-carrying data
title_sort proof carrying data
topic Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61151
work_keys_str_mv AT chiesaalessandro proofcarryingdata
AT chiesaalessandro pcd