Matter, Mind and Models
This paper attempts to explain why people become confused by questions about the relation between menal and physical events. When a question leads to confused, inconsistent answers, this may be (1) because the question is ultimately meaningless or at least unanswerable, but it may also be (2) becaus...
| Main Author: | |
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| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2004
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/6119 |
| _version_ | 1826217632845529088 |
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| author | Minsky, Marvin |
| author_facet | Minsky, Marvin |
| author_sort | Minsky, Marvin |
| collection | MIT |
| description | This paper attempts to explain why people become confused by questions about the relation between menal and physical events. When a question leads to confused, inconsistent answers, this may be (1) because the question is ultimately meaningless or at least unanswerable, but it may also be (2) because an adequate answer requires a powerful analytical apparatus. My view is that many important questions about relation between mind and brain are of this latter kind, and that some of the necessary technical and conceptual tools are becoming available as a result of work on he problems of making computer programs behave intelligently. In this paper we suggest a theory of why introspection does not give clear answers to these questions. The paper does not go very far toward finding technical solutions to the questions, but there is probably some value in finding at least a clear explanation of why we are confused. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:06:47Z |
| id | mit-1721.1/6119 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:06:47Z |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/61192019-04-11T02:47:41Z Matter, Mind and Models Minsky, Marvin This paper attempts to explain why people become confused by questions about the relation between menal and physical events. When a question leads to confused, inconsistent answers, this may be (1) because the question is ultimately meaningless or at least unanswerable, but it may also be (2) because an adequate answer requires a powerful analytical apparatus. My view is that many important questions about relation between mind and brain are of this latter kind, and that some of the necessary technical and conceptual tools are becoming available as a result of work on he problems of making computer programs behave intelligently. In this paper we suggest a theory of why introspection does not give clear answers to these questions. The paper does not go very far toward finding technical solutions to the questions, but there is probably some value in finding at least a clear explanation of why we are confused. 2004-10-04T14:39:58Z 2004-10-04T14:39:58Z 1965-03-01 AIM-077 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/6119 en_US AIM-077 1802318 bytes 268279 bytes application/postscript application/pdf application/postscript application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Minsky, Marvin Matter, Mind and Models |
| title | Matter, Mind and Models |
| title_full | Matter, Mind and Models |
| title_fullStr | Matter, Mind and Models |
| title_full_unstemmed | Matter, Mind and Models |
| title_short | Matter, Mind and Models |
| title_sort | matter mind and models |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/6119 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT minskymarvin mattermindandmodels |