Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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American Economic Association
2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61663 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
| _version_ | 1811072423048511488 |
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| author | Kojima, Fuhito Pathak, Parag |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Kojima, Fuhito Pathak, Parag |
| author_sort | Kojima, Fuhito |
| collection | MIT |
| description | A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:05:43Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/61663 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:05:43Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/616632022-09-26T10:23:10Z Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets Kojima, Fuhito Pathak, Parag Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Pathak, Parag Pathak, Parag A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets. National Science Foundation (U.S.) Spencer Foundation 2011-03-11T14:36:14Z 2011-03-11T14:36:14Z 2009-06 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61663 Kojima, Fuhito, and Parag A. Pathak. 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets." American Economic Review, 99(3): 608–27.© 2009 AEA https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.608 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Kojima, Fuhito Pathak, Parag Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| title | Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| title_full | Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| title_fullStr | Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| title_short | Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| title_sort | incentives and stability in large two sided matching markets |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61663 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kojimafuhito incentivesandstabilityinlargetwosidedmatchingmarkets AT pathakparag incentivesandstabilityinlargetwosidedmatchingmarkets |