Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again. Understanding when and why it occurs is important both for the design of economic insti...
Main Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew, Pathak, Parag |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Elsevier
2011
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61665 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
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