Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation

This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge. Each firm receives a signal on the success probability of a project and decide...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Acemoglu, Daron, Bimpikis, Konstantinos, Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: American Economic Association 2011
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61714
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
_version_ 1811070520154652672
author Acemoglu, Daron
Bimpikis, Konstantinos
Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Acemoglu, Daron
Bimpikis, Konstantinos
Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
author_sort Acemoglu, Daron
collection MIT
description This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge. Each firm receives a signal on the success probability of a project and decides when to experiment. Successes can be copied. First, we assume that signal qualities are the same. Symmetric equilibria involve delayed and staggered experimentation, whereas the optimal allocation never involves delays and may involve simultaneous experimentation. Appropriately designed patents implement the optimal allocation. Finally, we discuss the case when signals differ and are private information.
first_indexed 2024-09-23T08:37:20Z
format Article
id mit-1721.1/61714
institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
language en_US
last_indexed 2024-09-23T08:37:20Z
publishDate 2011
publisher American Economic Association
record_format dspace
spelling mit-1721.1/617142022-09-30T10:01:05Z Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation Acemoglu, Daron Bimpikis, Konstantinos Ozdaglar, Asuman E. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Acemoglu, Daron Acemoglu, Daron Bimpikis, Konstantinos Ozdaglar, Asuman E. This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge. Each firm receives a signal on the success probability of a project and decides when to experiment. Successes can be copied. First, we assume that signal qualities are the same. Symmetric equilibria involve delayed and staggered experimentation, whereas the optimal allocation never involves delays and may involve simultaneous experimentation. Appropriately designed patents implement the optimal allocation. Finally, we discuss the case when signals differ and are private information. 2011-03-17T19:36:22Z 2011-03-17T19:36:22Z 2011-02 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1945-7669 1945-7685 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61714 Acemoglu, Daron, Kostas Bimpikis, and Asuman Ozdaglar. 2011. "Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(1): 37–77. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.1.37 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf American Economic Association MIT web domain
spellingShingle Acemoglu, Daron
Bimpikis, Konstantinos
Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
title Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
title_full Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
title_fullStr Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
title_full_unstemmed Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
title_short Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
title_sort experimentation patents and innovation
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61714
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
work_keys_str_mv AT acemogludaron experimentationpatentsandinnovation
AT bimpikiskonstantinos experimentationpatentsandinnovation
AT ozdaglarasumane experimentationpatentsandinnovation