Power Fluctuations and Political Economy

We study (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy where the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. For high discount factors, the economy converges to a first-best allocation where labor supply decisions are not distorted. For low disc...

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Main Authors: Acemoglu, Daron, Golosov, Michael, Tsyvinski, Aleh
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Elsevier 2011
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61784
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
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author Acemoglu, Daron
Golosov, Michael
Tsyvinski, Aleh
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Acemoglu, Daron
Golosov, Michael
Tsyvinski, Aleh
author_sort Acemoglu, Daron
collection MIT
description We study (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy where the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. For high discount factors, the economy converges to a first-best allocation where labor supply decisions are not distorted. For low discount factors, distortions do not disappear and fluctuate over time. Most importantly, the set of sustainable first-best allocations is larger when there is less persistence in the identity of the party in power (because this encourages political compromise). This result contradicts the common presumption that there will be fewer distortions when there is a “stable ruling group”.
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spelling mit-1721.1/617842022-10-03T08:23:08Z Power Fluctuations and Political Economy Acemoglu, Daron Golosov, Michael Tsyvinski, Aleh Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, Daron Acemoglu, Daron We study (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy where the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. For high discount factors, the economy converges to a first-best allocation where labor supply decisions are not distorted. For low discount factors, distortions do not disappear and fluctuate over time. Most importantly, the set of sustainable first-best allocations is larger when there is less persistence in the identity of the party in power (because this encourages political compromise). This result contradicts the common presumption that there will be fewer distortions when there is a “stable ruling group”. National Science Foundation (U.S.) United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research 2011-03-24T18:19:03Z 2011-03-24T18:19:03Z 2010-11 2010-10 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0022-0531 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61784 Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski. “Power fluctuations and political economy.” Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 146, Issue 3, May 2011, Pages 1009–1041.© 2010 Elsevier Inc. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.11.002 Journal of Economic Theory Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Elsevier MIT web domain
spellingShingle Acemoglu, Daron
Golosov, Michael
Tsyvinski, Aleh
Power Fluctuations and Political Economy
title Power Fluctuations and Political Economy
title_full Power Fluctuations and Political Economy
title_fullStr Power Fluctuations and Political Economy
title_full_unstemmed Power Fluctuations and Political Economy
title_short Power Fluctuations and Political Economy
title_sort power fluctuations and political economy
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61784
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
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