A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions
I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are only well-defined relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White.
Main Author: | Rayo, Agustin |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group
2011
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61997 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1847-2770 |
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