Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62421 |
| _version_ | 1811097586721882112 |
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| author | Vavova, Ekaterina Dimitrova |
| author2 | Roger White. |
| author_facet | Roger White. Vavova, Ekaterina Dimitrova |
| author_sort | Vavova, Ekaterina Dimitrova |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:01:57Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/62421 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:01:57Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/624212019-04-10T21:38:18Z Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys Vavova, Ekaterina Dimitrova Roger White. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. Linguistics and Philosophy. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-84). I consider three ways in which our epistemic situation might be more impoverished than we ordinarily take it to be. I argue that we can save our robust epistemic lives from the skeptic. But only if we accept that they aren't quite as robust as we thought. In Chapter One, I ask whether the discovery that your belief has been influenced by your background should worry you. I provide a principled way of distinguishing between the kind of influence that is evidence of our own error, and the kind that is not. I argue, contra the dogmatist, that appropriate humility requires us to reduce confidence in response to the former. I conclude by explaining the nature and import of such humility: what it is, what accommodating it rationally amounts to, and why it need not entail skepticism. In Chapter Two, I ask whether awareness of disagreement calls for a similar sort of humility. Many of those who think it does make a plausible exception for propositions in which we are rationally highly confident. I show that, on the contrary, rational high confidence can make disagreement especially significant. This is because the significance of disagreement is largely shaped by our antecedent expectations, and we should not expect disagreement about propositions in which high confidence is appropriate. In Chapter Three, I consider whether a deflated theory of knowledge can help negotiate the path between skepticism and dogmatism more generally. I argue that knowing some proposition does not automatically entitle you to reason with it. The good news is that, on this view, we know a lot. The bad news is that most of what we know is junk: we cannot reason with it to gain more knowledge. It thus cannot play many of the roles that we typically want knowledge to play. by Ekaterina Dimitrova Vavova. Ph.D. 2011-04-25T15:56:06Z 2011-04-25T15:56:06Z 2010 2010 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62421 710986677 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 84 p. application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Linguistics and Philosophy. Vavova, Ekaterina Dimitrova Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys |
| title | Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys |
| title_full | Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys |
| title_fullStr | Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys |
| title_short | Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys |
| title_sort | rational humility and other epistemic killjoys |
| topic | Linguistics and Philosophy. |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62421 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT vavovaekaterinadimitrova rationalhumilityandotherepistemickilljoys |