Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions
October, 1999
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63529 |
| _version_ | 1826217073749000192 |
|---|---|
| author | Hendricks, Kenneth Pinkse, Joris Porter, Robert H. |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics Hendricks, Kenneth Pinkse, Joris Porter, Robert H. |
| author_sort | Hendricks, Kenneth |
| collection | MIT |
| description | October, 1999 |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:57:26Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/63529 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:57:26Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/635292019-04-10T17:04:08Z Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions Hendricks, Kenneth Pinkse, Joris Porter, Robert H. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics October, 1999 August, 1999--Added t.p 2011-06-09T05:34:55Z 2011-06-09T05:34:55Z 1999 Working Paper empiricalimplica00hend http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63529 45199033 000951352 Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 99-19 application/pdf Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Hendricks, Kenneth Pinkse, Joris Porter, Robert H. Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions |
| title | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions |
| title_full | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions |
| title_fullStr | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions |
| title_short | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions |
| title_sort | empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric common value auctions |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63529 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hendrickskenneth empiricalimplicationsofequilibriumbiddinginfirstpricesymmetriccommonvalueauctions AT pinksejoris empiricalimplicationsofequilibriumbiddinginfirstpricesymmetriccommonvalueauctions AT porterroberth empiricalimplicationsofequilibriumbiddinginfirstpricesymmetriccommonvalueauctions |