Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Abreu, Dilip, Dutta, Prajit K., Smith, Lones A.
Format: Working Paper
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63627
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author Abreu, Dilip
Dutta, Prajit K.
Smith, Lones A.
author_facet Abreu, Dilip
Dutta, Prajit K.
Smith, Lones A.
author_sort Abreu, Dilip
collection MIT
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institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
last_indexed 2024-09-23T10:25:58Z
publishDate 2011
publisher Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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spelling mit-1721.1/636272019-04-12T13:05:22Z Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition Abreu, Dilip Dutta, Prajit K. Smith, Lones A. 2011-06-09T15:29:28Z 2011-06-09T15:29:28Z 1992 Working Paper folktheoremsforr00abre http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63627 27320410 000636259 Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 92-15 application/pdf Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Abreu, Dilip
Dutta, Prajit K.
Smith, Lones A.
Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition
title Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition
title_full Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition
title_fullStr Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition
title_full_unstemmed Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition
title_short Folk theorems for repeated games : a NEU condition
title_sort folk theorems for repeated games a neu condition
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63627
work_keys_str_mv AT abreudilip folktheoremsforrepeatedgamesaneucondition
AT duttaprajitk folktheoremsforrepeatedgamesaneucondition
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