The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information
Main Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K., Maskin, Eric |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. : Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63634 |
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