Impact of higher-order uncertainty
March 2003. -- Date: First version: October, 2002; this version: March, 2003.--P. 1
Main Authors: | Weinstein, Jonathan, Yildiz, Muhamet |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
2011
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63742 |
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