Optimal collusion with private information

October, 1999

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Athey, Susan, Bagwell, Kyle
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Format: Working Paper
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63939
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author Athey, Susan
Bagwell, Kyle
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Athey, Susan
Bagwell, Kyle
author_sort Athey, Susan
collection MIT
description October, 1999
first_indexed 2024-09-23T09:42:01Z
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institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
last_indexed 2024-09-23T09:42:01Z
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publisher Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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spelling mit-1721.1/639392019-04-12T13:10:11Z Optimal collusion with private information Athey, Susan Bagwell, Kyle Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics October, 1999 First draft: May, 1998. This draft: September, 1999--Added t.p 2011-06-09T21:56:25Z 2011-06-09T21:56:25Z 1999 Working Paper optimalcollusion00athe http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63939 45200025 000951359 Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 99-17 application/pdf Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Athey, Susan
Bagwell, Kyle
Optimal collusion with private information
title Optimal collusion with private information
title_full Optimal collusion with private information
title_fullStr Optimal collusion with private information
title_full_unstemmed Optimal collusion with private information
title_short Optimal collusion with private information
title_sort optimal collusion with private information
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63939
work_keys_str_mv AT atheysusan optimalcollusionwithprivateinformation
AT bagwellkyle optimalcollusionwithprivateinformation