On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
Main Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew, Maskin, Eric |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63968 |
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