Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player
Main Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64081 |
Similar Items
-
Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information
by: Fudenberg, Drew, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
by: Fudenberg, Drew, et al.
Published: (2022) -
Finite player approximations to a continuum of players
by: Fudenberg, Drew, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales
by: Fudenberg, Drew, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
by: Fudenberg, Drew, et al.
Published: (2011)