Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games with conflicting interests
March 1991
Main Author: | Schmidt, Klaus M. |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. : Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64133 |
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