Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales
Main Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
Format: | Working Paper |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. : Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64154 |
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