Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distr...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Springer-Verlag
2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64927 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
| _version_ | 1826200443320008704 |
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| author | Ashlagi, Itai Serizawa, Shigehiro |
| author2 | Sloan School of Management |
| author_facet | Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai Serizawa, Shigehiro |
| author_sort | Ashlagi, Itai |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:36:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/64927 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:36:33Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Springer-Verlag |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/649272022-09-27T20:41:12Z Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity Ashlagi, Itai Serizawa, Shigehiro Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai Ashlagi, Itai We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality. 2011-07-20T15:40:41Z 2011-07-20T15:40:41Z 2011-05 2009-06 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0176-1714 1432-217X http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64927 Ashlagi, Itai, and Shigehiro Serizawa. “Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rule by Anonymity.” Social Choice and Welfare (2011:May) : 1-12. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0535-4 Social Choice and Welfare Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5 application/pdf Springer-Verlag Springer |
| spellingShingle | Ashlagi, Itai Serizawa, Shigehiro Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
| title | Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
| title_full | Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
| title_fullStr | Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
| title_short | Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
| title_sort | characterizing vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64927 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ashlagiitai characterizingvickreyallocationrulebyanonymity AT serizawashigehiro characterizingvickreyallocationrulebyanonymity |