A Political Theory of Populism
When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses ‘populist’ policies--i.e., policies to the left of th...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65159 |
| _version_ | 1826213973660270592 |
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| author | Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin |
| author_facet | Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin |
| author_sort | Acemoglu, Daron |
| collection | MIT |
| description | When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses ‘populist’ policies--i.e., policies to the left of the median voter--as a way of signaling that he is not from the right. Truly right-wing politicians respond by choosing more moderate, or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing politicians; when politicians are indeed more likely to have a hidden right-wing agenda; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We show that similar results apply when some politicians can be corrupted or influenced through other non-electoral means by the rich elite. We also show that ‘soft term limits’ may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:57:47Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/65159 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:57:47Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/651592019-04-11T09:14:50Z A Political Theory of Populism Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin Political economy Inequality Populism Voting Signaling When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses ‘populist’ policies--i.e., policies to the left of the median voter--as a way of signaling that he is not from the right. Truly right-wing politicians respond by choosing more moderate, or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing politicians; when politicians are indeed more likely to have a hidden right-wing agenda; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We show that similar results apply when some politicians can be corrupted or influenced through other non-electoral means by the rich elite. We also show that ‘soft term limits’ may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies. 2011-08-15T22:30:16Z 2011-08-15T22:30:16Z 2011-08-03 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65159 en_US Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics);11-21 An error occurred on the license name. An error occurred getting the license - uri. application/pdf Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Political economy Inequality Populism Voting Signaling Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin A Political Theory of Populism |
| title | A Political Theory of Populism |
| title_full | A Political Theory of Populism |
| title_fullStr | A Political Theory of Populism |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Political Theory of Populism |
| title_short | A Political Theory of Populism |
| title_sort | political theory of populism |
| topic | Political economy Inequality Populism Voting Signaling |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65159 |
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