A Political Theory of Populism
When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses ‘populist’ policies--i.e., policies to the left of th...
Main Authors: | Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy, Sonin, Konstantin |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2011
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65159 |
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