Must . . . stay . . . strong!
This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality.
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Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
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Springer Netherlands
2011
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65909 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7912-4246 |
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author | von Fintel, Kai Gillies, Anthony S. |
author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences |
author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences von Fintel, Kai Gillies, Anthony S. |
author_sort | von Fintel, Kai |
collection | MIT |
description | This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:25:17Z |
format | Article |
id | mit-1721.1/65909 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:25:17Z |
publishDate | 2011 |
publisher | Springer Netherlands |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/659092022-09-28T07:57:47Z Must . . . stay . . . strong! von Fintel, Kai Gillies, Anthony S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences von Fintel, Kai von Fintel, Kai This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality. It is a recurring matra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must. 2011-09-21T17:48:56Z 2011-09-21T17:48:56Z 2010-05 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0925-854X 1572-865X http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65909 von Fintel, Kai, and Anthony S. Gillies. “Must . . . Stay . . . Strong!” Natural Language Semantics 18.4 (2010) : 351-383. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7912-4246 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11050-010-9058-2 Natural Language Semantics Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Springer Netherlands Prof. von Fintel |
spellingShingle | von Fintel, Kai Gillies, Anthony S. Must . . . stay . . . strong! |
title | Must . . . stay . . . strong! |
title_full | Must . . . stay . . . strong! |
title_fullStr | Must . . . stay . . . strong! |
title_full_unstemmed | Must . . . stay . . . strong! |
title_short | Must . . . stay . . . strong! |
title_sort | must stay strong |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65909 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7912-4246 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT vonfintelkai muststaystrong AT gilliesanthonys muststaystrong |