Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations

Empirical studies of innovation have found that end users frequently develop important product and process innovations. Defying conventional wisdom on the negative effects of uncompensated spillovers, innovative users also often openly reveal their innovations to competing users and to manufacturers...

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Main Authors: Harhoff, Dietmar, Henkel, Joachim, von Hippel, Eric A.
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: Cambridge, MA; Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66264
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author Harhoff, Dietmar
Henkel, Joachim
von Hippel, Eric A.
author_facet Harhoff, Dietmar
Henkel, Joachim
von Hippel, Eric A.
author_sort Harhoff, Dietmar
collection MIT
description Empirical studies of innovation have found that end users frequently develop important product and process innovations. Defying conventional wisdom on the negative effects of uncompensated spillovers, innovative users also often openly reveal their innovations to competing users and to manufacturers. Rival users are thus in a position to reproduce the innovation in-house and benefit from using it, and manufacturers are in a position to refine the innovation and sell it to all users, including competitors of the user revealing its innovation. In this paper we explore the incentives that users might have to freely reveal their proprietary innovations. We then develop a game-theoretic model to explore the effect of these incentives on users’ decisions to reveal or hide their proprietary information. We find that, under realistic parameter constellations, free revealing pays. We conclude by discussing some implications of our findings.
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spelling mit-1721.1/662642019-04-12T14:55:35Z Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations Harhoff, Dietmar Henkel, Joachim von Hippel, Eric A. innovation lead users spillovers Empirical studies of innovation have found that end users frequently develop important product and process innovations. Defying conventional wisdom on the negative effects of uncompensated spillovers, innovative users also often openly reveal their innovations to competing users and to manufacturers. Rival users are thus in a position to reproduce the innovation in-house and benefit from using it, and manufacturers are in a position to refine the innovation and sell it to all users, including competitors of the user revealing its innovation. In this paper we explore the incentives that users might have to freely reveal their proprietary innovations. We then develop a game-theoretic model to explore the effect of these incentives on users’ decisions to reveal or hide their proprietary information. We find that, under realistic parameter constellations, free revealing pays. We conclude by discussing some implications of our findings. 2011-10-14T19:45:27Z 2011-10-14T19:45:27Z 2009-01 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66264 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4749-09 application/pdf Cambridge, MA; Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle innovation
lead users
spillovers
Harhoff, Dietmar
Henkel, Joachim
von Hippel, Eric A.
Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations
title Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations
title_full Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations
title_fullStr Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations
title_full_unstemmed Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations
title_short Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations
title_sort profiting from voluntary information spillovers how users benefit by freely revealing their innovations
topic innovation
lead users
spillovers
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66264
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AT henkeljoachim profitingfromvoluntaryinformationspillovershowusersbenefitbyfreelyrevealingtheirinnovations
AT vonhippelerica profitingfromvoluntaryinformationspillovershowusersbenefitbyfreelyrevealingtheirinnovations