Innovation Incentives for Information Goods

This version published in "Innovation Incentives for Information Goods," Innovation Policy and the Economy eds. Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, 2007 vol. 7. Previous version in published as “Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Novel Mechanism for Providing Innovation Incentives for...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Brynjolfsson, Erik, Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael)
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: Cambridge, MA; Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66928
_version_ 1811081498770538496
author Brynjolfsson, Erik
Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael)
author_facet Brynjolfsson, Erik
Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael)
author_sort Brynjolfsson, Erik
collection MIT
description This version published in "Innovation Incentives for Information Goods," Innovation Policy and the Economy eds. Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, 2007 vol. 7. Previous version in published as “Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Novel Mechanism for Providing Innovation Incentives for Digital Goods” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems, December, 2004.
first_indexed 2024-09-23T11:47:39Z
format Working Paper
id mit-1721.1/66928
institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
language en_US
last_indexed 2024-09-23T11:47:39Z
publishDate 2011
publisher Cambridge, MA; Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
record_format dspace
spelling mit-1721.1/669282019-04-10T15:31:19Z Innovation Incentives for Information Goods Brynjolfsson, Erik Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael) Online Content Information Mechanism Design Incentives Innovation Bundling Digital Goods This version published in "Innovation Incentives for Information Goods," Innovation Policy and the Economy eds. Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, 2007 vol. 7. Previous version in published as “Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Novel Mechanism for Providing Innovation Incentives for Digital Goods” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems, December, 2004. Innovations can often be targeted to be more valuable for some consumers than others. This is especially true for digital information goods. We show that the traditional price system not only results in significant deadweight loss, but also provides incorrect incentives to the creators of these innovations. In contrast, we propose and analyze a profit-maximizing mechanism for bundles of digital goods which is more efficient and more accurately provides innovation incentives for information goods. Our “statistical couponing mechanism” does not rely on the universal excludability of information goods, which creates substantial deadweight loss, but instead estimates social value created from new goods and innovations by offering coupons to a relatively small sample of representative consumers. We find that the statistical couponing mechanism can operate with less than 0.1% of the deadweight loss of the traditional price-based system, while more accurately aligning incentives with social value. The MIT Center for Digital Business, the National Bureau of Economic Research and that National Science Foundation (IIS-0085725) provided generous research funding. 2011-11-04T15:46:51Z 2011-11-04T15:46:51Z 2006-06-01 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66928 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4780-10 application/pdf Cambridge, MA; Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Online Content
Information
Mechanism Design
Incentives
Innovation
Bundling
Digital Goods
Brynjolfsson, Erik
Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael)
Innovation Incentives for Information Goods
title Innovation Incentives for Information Goods
title_full Innovation Incentives for Information Goods
title_fullStr Innovation Incentives for Information Goods
title_full_unstemmed Innovation Incentives for Information Goods
title_short Innovation Incentives for Information Goods
title_sort innovation incentives for information goods
topic Online Content
Information
Mechanism Design
Incentives
Innovation
Bundling
Digital Goods
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66928
work_keys_str_mv AT brynjolfssonerik innovationincentivesforinformationgoods
AT zhangxiaoquanmichael innovationincentivesforinformationgoods