Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism

This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10. 1073/pnas.1011734108/-/DCSupplemental.

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Moran, Joseph M., Young, Liane L., Saxe, Rebecca R., Lee, Su Mei, O'Young, Daniel, Mavros, Penelope L., Gabrieli, John D. E.
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69911
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1158-5692
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author Moran, Joseph M.
Young, Liane L.
Saxe, Rebecca R.
Lee, Su Mei
O'Young, Daniel
Mavros, Penelope L.
Gabrieli, John D. E.
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Moran, Joseph M.
Young, Liane L.
Saxe, Rebecca R.
Lee, Su Mei
O'Young, Daniel
Mavros, Penelope L.
Gabrieli, John D. E.
author_sort Moran, Joseph M.
collection MIT
description This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10. 1073/pnas.1011734108/-/DCSupplemental.
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spelling mit-1721.1/699112022-09-26T16:15:22Z Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism Moran, Joseph M. Young, Liane L. Saxe, Rebecca R. Lee, Su Mei O'Young, Daniel Mavros, Penelope L. Gabrieli, John D. E. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Gabrieli, John D. E. Moran, Joseph M. Young, Liane L. Saxe, Rebecca R. Lee, Su Mei O'Young, Daniel Mavros, Penelope L. Gabrieli, John D. E. This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10. 1073/pnas.1011734108/-/DCSupplemental. High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person's beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person's actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person's innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action's negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment. 2012-03-30T21:45:50Z 2012-03-30T21:45:50Z 2011-02 2010-08 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0027-8424 1091-6490 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69911 Moran, J. M. et al. “Impaired Theory of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-functioning Autism.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108.7 (2011): 2688–2692. Web. 30 Mar. 2012. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1158-5692 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1011734108 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) PNAS
spellingShingle Moran, Joseph M.
Young, Liane L.
Saxe, Rebecca R.
Lee, Su Mei
O'Young, Daniel
Mavros, Penelope L.
Gabrieli, John D. E.
Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism
title Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism
title_full Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism
title_fullStr Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism
title_full_unstemmed Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism
title_short Impaired Theory Of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism
title_sort impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high functioning autism
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69911
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1158-5692
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